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CEE-M Seminar

CEE-M Seminar

Optimal Patronage


Mikhail Drugov
Associate Professor
New Economic School



We study the design of promotions in an organization where agents belong to groups that advance their cause. Examples and applications include political groups, ethnicities, agents motivated by the work in the public sector and corruption. In an overlapping generations model, juniors compete for promotions. Seniors have two kinds of discretion: direct discretion, which allows an immediate advancement of their cause, and promotion discretion (patronage), which allows a biasing of the promotion decision in favour of the juniors from their group. We consider two settings di¤ering in the planner’s goal, maximizing juniors’ efforts and affecting the steady-state composition of the senior level towards the preferred group, and show that patronage may be strictly positive in both of them. We also apply the second setting to the case of corruption.

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Site St Charles - Batiment Saint Charles 2, salle 06 - Rue du Professeur Henri Serre, 34090 Montpellier

Dates & time

Mar 08, 2018


Petros Sekeris
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Raphaël Soubeyran
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